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Abstract 
This article analyses the manner in which the parliaments of France, the 
UK and Greece have reacted to the process of European integration.  It is 
argued that their reaction displays an incremental logic marked by slow, 
small and marginal changes based on existing institutional repertoires.  In 
all three cases parliaments have used familiar mechanisms and procedures 
which they have modified only marginally.  This reaction was path 
dependent, i.e. it was consistent with long-established patterns reflecting 




European integration and national polities 
 The process of European integration poses an important challenge for national 
polities.  Given the central role of national executives in the decision-making process of 
the European Union (Kassim and Wright, 1991), national parliaments have come to regard 
integration as a threat to their powers: governments can adopt legally binding decisions at 
the level of the EU which in the domestic context would normally require the involvement 
of Parliament.  This has always been a significant facet of the so-called ‘democratic 
deficit’.  Moreover, the initial weakness of the European Parliament further underlined the 
weak parliamentary input in the EU policy process.  The problem was more acute in 
member states like the UK, where the very issue of membership was politically 
contentious.  How did national parliaments respond to these challenges?  Did they follow 
innovative or traditional patterns?  When change occurred, what shaped it?  The question 
then arises as to how parliamentary institutions change.   
Institutional theory offers interesting insights regarding the pace and the direction 
of institutional change, which is construed here as change in ‘formal structure, 
organizational culture and goals, programme or mission’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, p. 
81).  This article focuses on change in formal structure and goals1 because these factors 
structure the relationships between participants (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992) in the policy 
process as well as the system of expectations (Luhmann, 1999) and, thus, the behaviour 
associated with institutions.   
The article goes beyond the mere description of formal structures and goals, and 
places them in the political context within which they operate (section II).  The analysis, 
however, concentrates on EU-specific mechanisms for parliamentary scrutiny since these 
 
* The author is grateful to Anand Menon, Argyris Passas and two anonymous referees for providing very 
helpful comments on an earlier draft.  The usual disclaimer applies.   
1 To be sure, there is the broader issue of the impact of European integration upon national parliaments, the 
analysis of which would entail an examination of other dimensions, including party politics.  However, this 
issue goes beyond the scope of this article, which focuses specifically on the relations between legislatures 
and executives in the conduct of EU policy.   
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mechanisms combine horizontal and sectoral roles in the sense that they deal not only 
with policy-specific issues but also with the development of the process of integration2.  
Finally, the article focuses on the cases of France, the UK and Greece, for three reasons.  
First, they have historically approached the process of integration in distinct ways.  
Secondly, they have joined the, then, EC at different stages of its historical development.  
Finally, they share an institutional legacy that is underpinned by the centralisation of 
power.  How did the parliaments of these member states respond to the common pressures 
that stem from the process of integration?  The analysis proceeds in three steps.  In the 
following sub-section, recent institutionalist approaches are discussed and lessons are 
drawn with regard to the direction and the pace of institutional change.  Section II gives an 
account of the development of parliamentary mechanisms for the scrutiny of EU policy.  
Then, in Section III, the discussion turns to the nature of institutional change.   
The main thrust of the argument is that the parliaments of France, the UK and 
Greece have responded to the challenge of European integration in an incremental and 
path dependent manner.  In particular, they have responded broadly by using their own 
standard operating procedures and institutional repertoires rather than by innovating, in a 
manner that confirms existing patterns of interactions with national governments.  The 
marginal, incremental changes that occurred  
(a) followed developments at the level of the EU, thus underlining the reactive approach 
adopted by national parliaments and, more importantly,  
(b) were largely beneficial to skilful national governments, contrary to the initial 
objectives of some reformers.  In that sense, change was path dependent since it 
reproduced existing patterns.  Indeed, more ambitious attempts to promote change 
failed on the grounds that they were ‘inappropriate.’   
 
The pace and direction of institutional change 
 Institutions tend to reflect the environment in which they operate.  This is 
achieved, inter alia, by the incorporation of environmental structure which involves the 
evolution of organisational structure over time ‘through an adaptive, unplanned and 
historical process’ (Scott, 1991, p. 179).  Although abrupt and radical institutional change 
is possible (Krasner, 1984, p. 240), it is normally followed by long periods of stability or 
incremental change marked by small, timid steps which conform to a broader pattern.  
This is so because ‘the self-reinforcing feedback mechanisms that support path dependent 
processes make it difficult for organizations to explore alternative options’ (Powell, 1991, 
p. 197).  Indeed, as Krasner (1984, p. 240) notes, ‘institutions generated by functional 
demands of the past can perpetuate themselves into a future whose functional imperatives 
are radically different’.  Comparative analyses of attempts to re-organise national 
administrations in the USA, the UK and Nordic countries reveal significant differences 
between them.  These differences are rooted in historical and institutional factors.  
Institutions ‘embed historical experience into rules, routines and forms that persist beyond 
the historical moment and condition’ (March and Olsen, 1989, p. 167).   
Institutions preserve themselves not only by resisting some forms of change but 
also by developing their own criteria for the definition of appropriate and successful 
action (March and Olsen, 1989).  They possess a stock of responses (institutional 
repertoires) that serve as the primary source of routine responses whenever there is a 
perceived need for change.  Thus, adaptation is the main pattern that emerges from these 
incremental processes.  Institutions evolve through a process of ‘experiential learning’ 
 
2 This combination of horizontal and sectoral roles is the key difference that distinguishes them from 
sectoral mechanisms, which deal, for example, with agricultural policy.   
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based on trial and error, whereby appropriate responses are selected on the basis of rules, 
standard operating procedures and norms linking roles and situations.  In addition, the 
direction of institutional change is usually ‘path dependent’.  Krasner’s (1984) model of 
punctuated equilibrium is underpinned by the logic of path dependence.  Discussing the 
manner in which states change, he argues that it is impossible to start anew with every 
change in needs and power capabilities because previous choices either increase the cost 
of new strategies or preclude them altogether (Krasner, 1984, p. 240).  Hence, this process 
bears the hallmarks of history since past choices affect future developments.  More 
importantly, the mere existence of institutions creates a set of expectations that render 
specific courses of action more appropriate than others.  Thus, even when there are calls 
for change, they are assessed on the basis of conceptions and images of ‘appropriate 
action’ that are shaped by a longer-lasting historically defined process.   
 How, then, did the French, British and Greek Parliaments respond to the challenge 
of European integration?  Did they innovate or was their response a product of path 
dependence?   
 
II. The development of the machinery for scrutiny: The logic of small steps 
 
France 
 The French Constitution of 1958 has had a major impact upon the role of 
Parliament.  ‘The 1958 Constitution was drawn up as a reaction to the 1946 Constitution 
that granted broad powers to Parliament.  As a result, the 1958 Constitution restricts and 
gags Parliament, in fact preventing it from exercising its powers of control’ (Cot, 1980, p. 
11).  The response of the two Houses to European integration follows this pattern 
established by the Constitution of 1958.   
Art. 43 limits the number of permanent commissions to six in order to ensure that 
they do not ‘shadow’ ministerial departments as they did before 1958 (Burdeau, Hamon 
and Troper, 1993, p. 573).  The prevailing view within the French Parliament was that 
European affairs were an aspect of foreign policy, which was scrutinised by a specialised 
dominant parliamentary commission in each House.  Therefore, until 1979 the two Houses 
had no EC-specific mechanisms.  However, the first direct election of MEPs in 1979 
created a competitor to both Houses.  Hence the establishment in 1979 of one délégation 
in each House (République Française, 1979).   
This was the first time that délégations were used for the scrutiny of a policy area 
that traditionally had been considered an aspect of foreign policy.  This was an important 
development for it was the first case in which the activity of the government in a major 
policy area would be partly scrutinised by a mechanism whose status was inferior to 
parliamentary commissions. Nevertheless, the innovative nature of this choice must not be 
overstated.  Rather, it confirmed existing patterns, since the commissions remained the 
dominant players within the parliamentary sphere while the délégations were already 
being used for the scrutiny of other policy areas (Laporte, 1981).   
Indeed, the eighteen members of the délégations were drawn from all six 
permanent commissions, although the powerful commission of foreign affairs, which was 
then chaired by Maurice Couve de Murville, de Gaulle’s Minister of Foreign Affairs in the 
1960s, was over-represented.  Prior to the establishment of the délégations, Couve de 
Murville was very keen to underline their subordinate status.  He therefore stressed the 
fact that the délégations were no more than an intermediary between the government and 
the commissions; the latter alone had the responsibility for issues of substance (Laporte, 
1981, p. 133).   
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 The objective of the two délégations was to inform the two Houses about the 
activities of European institutions.  The government was under an obligation to provide 
EC documents giving information regarding negotiations in Brussels prior to the adoption 
of formal decisions and covering issues in the domain of the law which, under art. 34 of 
the French Constitution of 1958, primarily concerns civil rights, penal law, taxation, 
national defence and the nationalisation of industries—i.e. issues in which the then EC 
had little, if any, involvement.  The délégations could then present their own conclusions 
to the relevant permanent commission of each House.   
 The role of the délégations within the two Houses remained weak throughout the 
1980s.  They can be depicted as two clearing houses.  They had the power to propose non-
binding resolutions to a permanent commission which, in turn, could impose its own 
amendments or even reject the proposal altogether.  However, these resolutions have 
never had any binding effect upon the French government.  Hence, the scrutiny system 
has been predominantly geared toward information-gathering rather than influencing the 
stance of the government (Cottereau, 1982, p. 46).  In addition to these inherent 
weaknesses, scrutiny has been further undermined by the government, which has only 
partly fulfilled its obligations regarding the transmission of documents.  Therefore, the 
délégations have successfully sought to obtain documents from the European Parliament, 
the Commission and the Council.  Paradoxically, this has enabled them to be better 
informed about developments at the European level than about the position of the French 
government (Groud, 1991, p. 1318).   
 After the Single European Act came into force – strengthening the role of the 
European Parliament, expanding the agenda of the then EC and increasing the use of 
qualified majority voting – further marginal changes were introduced to the French system 
of scrutiny (République Française, 1990).  They primarily focused on (a) a more balanced 
representation of permanent commissions in each délégation; (b) an increase in their 
membership to 36; and (c) a widening of the range of documents that came under scrutiny 
to include all draft pieces of European legislation.  In addition, the délégations have been 
granted the right to ask - but not to oblige - ministers to give evidence.  Hence, the basic 
pattern of incremental and path dependent change has been confirmed.   
 The adoption of the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) enabled the 
French Parliament to enhance the profile of the scrutiny mechanism without increasing its 
powers.  The ‘constitutionalisation’ of this mechanism through an amendment of art. 88 of 
the French Constitution was merely the ‘price’ the socialist government had to pay in 
order to ensure the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (Alberton, 1995, p. 922).  Surely 
that was a small price to pay for such a major step in the process of integration. It was of 
great symbolic significance in that it has elevated the parliamentary scrutiny of EU policy 
to the top level in the hierarchy of French legal rules.  The two Houses won the right to 
pass resolutions on EU policy but there was a price to be paid too: the constitutional 
provision referred only to proposals involving provisions of a legislative nature, thereby 
limiting the scope of scrutiny to the pre-1990 arrangements.   
The importance of the ‘constitutionalisation’ of this process must not be overstated 
since the Constitution appropriately does not mention the délégations.  It merely refers to 
the National Assembly and the Senate since otherwise it would contradict the 
predominance of the commissions which is recognised by the French Constitution (art. 
43).  More importantly, the constitutionalisation of parliamentary scrutiny in effect re-
produced the logic of path dependent, incremental change.  It has led to the establishment 
by the French government of a procedure aiming to ensure compliance with the new 
constitutional provisions (République Française, 1994; 1999).  This procedure ensures 
that the government not only remains the dominant player but can also use parliamentary 
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procedures as a bargaining tool in Brussels.  Indeed, when Parliament intends to issue a 
resolution but is unable to do so prior to the meeting of the Council of Ministers, a 
distinction is drawn between two cases.  In the first case, when the relevant piece of draft 
EU legislation is placed on the agenda of the Council of Ministers up to fourteen days 
before a Council meeting and there is no ‘urgency’ or ‘special motive’, the French 
member of COREPER is instructed to declare that the French government opposes the 
inclusion of this issue on the agenda.  In the second case, when a piece of draft EU 
legislation has been placed on the agenda of the Council of Ministers more than fourteen 
days before the meeting of the Council, the internal rules of procedure of the Council do 
not allow national representatives to block its inclusion on the agenda of the Council.  
Nevertheless, if there is no ‘urgency’ or ‘special motive’, the French representative will 
attempt to postpone a formal adoption of the decision without abstaining from discussions 
in the Council.   
The development of the French mechanism for the scrutiny of EU policy confirms 
the argument presented in this article.  It has been both incremental – i.e., it has proceeded 
by means of small, marginal changes based on existing institutional repertoires – and path 
dependent, in that it has neither altered nor challenged the balance of power between the 
Executive and Parliament.  The French government has retained a free hand in 
negotiations which is precisely the pattern that prevails in the UK as well.   
 
The UK 
 Unlike the French Parliament, Westminster was quick to react to the accession of 
the UK to the EC.  The issue of the erosion of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty 
was at the heart of the debate between opponents and advocates of accession (Taylor, 
1975, p. 279).  However, the stance of the Conservative government was both carefully 
defined and firm.  Even before the accession of the UK, the Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster noted that  
 
the Government are deeply concerned that Parliament, as well as United 
Kingdom Ministers should play its full part when future Community 
policies are being formulated, and in particular that Parliament should be 
informed about and have an opportunity to consider at the formative stage 
those Community instruments which, when made by the Council, will be 
binding in this country (emphasis added) (House of Commons Debates, 
vol. 873, 21 December 1972, col. 1743). 
 
This, however, did not lead to the creation of a totally new mechanism.  The House of 
Commons utilised the select committee method (European Scrutiny Select Committee, 
formerly Select Committee on European Legislation) as a first step towards the 
establishment of this mechanism (House of Commons Debates, vol. 873, 7 May 1974, 
cols. 361-2).  The sixteen-strong committee has been empowered to consider draft EC 
legislation and other European documents, to report on whether they raise ‘questions of 
legal or political importance’ and to make recommendations for further consideration of 
these documents by the House.  Although no guidelines have been provided on what 
constitutes a question of legal and political importance, the principal criteria used are the 
effect on UK law, contentiousness and financial implications (Norton, 1995b, p. 96).   
 Prior to 1991, once a document had been recommended for debate by the select 
committee, the debate could take place either on the Floor of the House or in a standing 
committee.  Yet debates on the Floor of the House took place after 10pm and were poorly 
attended (Bates, 1991, p. 123).  This led the House to establish in 1991 two permanent 
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standing committees - unlike ordinary standing committees, which lapse when their 
deliberations end – where debates on European documents could take place.  In fact, the 
permanent nature of the two standing committees is the most innovative element of 
institutional adaptation in the House of Commons.   
Moreover, the development of the Commons’ internal rules regarding relations 
with the government has been consistently incremental.  The modification adopted in 
1980 - i.e. immediately after the first direct election of MEPs – was politically shrewd and 
consistent with the symbolic value attached to Westminster.   The new arrangement 
formally recognised the obligation of British ministers to avoid giving their agreement in 
Brussels before the end of the parliamentary scrutiny of a document.  This arrangement 
constitutes the most important procedural ‘constraint’ on the government and is widely 
envied by other parliaments in the EU (Norton, 1995b, p. 107).  The relevant Resolution 
obliged ministers to withhold agreement when  
 
‘a proposal for European legislation has been recommended by the Select 
Committee on European Legislation for consideration by the House before 
the House has given it consideration unless (a) that committee has 
indicated that agreement need not be withheld, or (b) the Minister 
concerned decides that for special reasons agreement should not be 
withheld; and in the latter case the Minister should, at the first opportunity 
thereafter, explain the reasons for his decision to the House’. (House of 
Commons Debates, vol. 991, 30 October 1980, col. 843).   
 
But why would a powerful newly elected government constrain itself?  
Paradoxically, this arrangement was not only consistent with Margaret Thatcher’s 
criticism of the then EC, but was also a powerful argument in negotiations in Brussels.  In 
fact, it is more useful to the government than the Parliament itself.  This is so because the 
government maintained a significant margin for action by stating that ministers could 
easily overcome this negative procedural constraint if ‘special reasons’ rendered it 
necessary.  The very broad terms in which these reasons were defined further enhances the 
validity of this argument.  The criteria used in this assessment include the need to avoid a 
legal vacuum; the desirability of permitting a particular measure of benefit to the UK to 
come into force as soon as possible and the difficulty, especially in the case of protracted 
or difficult negotiations, of putting a late reserve on a measure which will have little effect 
on the UK or which is likely to be of benefit to the UK.  More importantly, assessing 
whether these criteria are satisfied remains firmly in the hands of the government.  This 
arrangement has been confirmed by resolutions adopted in 1990 (House of Commons 
Debates, vol. 178, 24 October 1990, col. 399) and 1998 (see House of Commons Debates, 
vol. 319, 17 November 1998, col. 778).  This resolution further extends the right of 
ministers not to withhold agreement for proposals that they consider to be ‘confidential’.   
Ironically, the idea that MPs could hold ministers accountable for action taken in 
Brussels seems to have reduced the time allocated to debates on European affairs on the 
Floor of the House of Commons prior to the establishment of the permanent standing 
committees.  While the average time spent in 1978–80 was 47 hours, in 1981–88 it fell to 
32 hours (author’s calculations based on data from Boulton, 1989, p. 271).   
 Institutional adaptation in the House of Lords followed the basic select committee 
model (House of Lords Debates, vol. 350, 10 April 1974, col. 1229).  The committee has 
twenty members and broadly suits the Lords’ system, which is characterised by an 
absence of departmental select committees.  The committee operates in a rather 
decentralised manner.  It has appointed six specialised sub-committees (Economic and 
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Financial Affairs, Trade and External Relations; Energy, Industry and Transport; 
Common Foreign and Security Policy; Environment, Agriculture, Public Health and 
Consumer Protection; Law and Institutions; Social Affairs, Education and Home Affairs) 
and, following a double ‘sift’ (one by the chairman of the committee and one by each sub-
committee), scrutiny focuses on a small number of documents which are then analysed in 
greater detail.  This underpins one of the committee’s most important strengths, namely, 
the scrutiny of policy trends rather than specific pieces of draft legislation.  Most of the 20 
to 30 reports that it produces each year are recommended for debate that takes place on 
the Floor of the House.  In 1999, post-1990 arrangements used in the House of Commons-
obliging ministers to withhold agreement if scrutiny has not been completed-have been 
extended to the House of Lords (House of Lords Debates, 6 December 1999, cols. 1019-
20).   
 As in the French Parliament, institutional change at Westminster has followed an 
incremental and path dependent logic.  The two Houses have essentially used existing 
mechanisms and procedures in order to respond to pressures for change stemming from 
the process of integration.  More importantly, change has failed to challenge the 
established patterns of interactions between the Parliament and the Executive whereby the 
accountability of the latter to the former has declined over time (see Dunleavy and Jones 
with Burnham, Elgie and Fysh 1993; Burnham and Jones with Elgie 1995).  The case of 
the Greek Parliament is underpinned by a similar pattern.   
 
Greece 
 Art. 3 of Law 945/1979 by which the Greek Parliament ratified the Treaty of 
Accession obliged the government to submit to the Parliament an annual report on 
developments in the process of integration.  However, the first government report on the 
development of the process of integration was submitted to the Parliament in May 1989, 
eight years after Greece’s accession.  The Greek Parliament did not use its powers to 
establish an EC-specific mechanism for scrutiny until 1990.  The establishment of the 
Greek Parliament’s European Community Affairs Committee in June 1990 (Hellenic 
Parliament 1990) - almost ten years after the Greek accession - was primarily an attempt 
to fill a significant gap regarding information on the process of European integration.  
This was reflected in the composition of the committee, which was chaired by a vice-
chairman of the Greek Parliament and included twelve Greek MEPs and an equal number 
of MPs.  This composition was the only innovative characteristic of the committee, which, 
however, also demonstrated its weakness and functional orientation.   
Indeed, the participation of MEPs was designed to improve the channels of 
information between the Greek Parliament and Brussels.  However, this has contributed to 
the committee’s weakness.  The committee’s objective was to monitor and express a view 
on the process of integration and the actions of Greek ‘public authorities’ therein.  Its 
opinion could not have a binding effect on the Greek government precisely because the 
committee included MEPs, i.e. members of a body that can have no formal link with the 
Greek government.  Moreover, mixed membership has become a major source of 
problems.  MEPs and MPs reportedly (To Vima, 17 October 1999) find it very hard to 
agree on whether to meet on Fridays (so as to enable the former to return from Brussels) 
or during the other working days of the week (in order to allow the latter to return to their 
constituencies for the weekend).   
The committee primarily focuses on institutional issues; co-operation between the 
Greek Parliament and the European Parliament; European policies and texts that have to 
be ‘ratified’ by the Greek Parliament; and the decisions of (permanent) commissions of 
the Greek Parliament regarding European affairs.  The Greek government must inform the 
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committee about ‘every draft text concerning Community policy’.  Moreover, if invited by 
the committee, ministers are obliged to give evidence.  The committee meets whenever its 
members, chairman and vice chairmen decide to do so.  Its opinion is transmitted either to 
one of the permanent commissions or to the Floor of the House where a debate can take 
place without a vote.  During the first three years of its existence the committee has held 
twenty meetings, has produced two reports (one on the Assises of November 1990 held in 
Rome and one on the meeting of COSAC of November 1991 held in The Hague), while 
members have represented the Greek Parliament in sessions of COSAC (Yiannis, 1993, p. 
8).  The modification in 1993 of the Parliament’s internal rules of procedure has 
transformed the committee into a permanent one without, however, increasing its powers.   
During the 1990s the Greek Parliament has confirmed its wider rubber-stamping 
role.  From October 1993 until June 1995 the European Community Affairs Committee 
has spent about 30 hours in meetings – 1.4 hours on average per month (Kathimerini, 16 
July 1995) – while only 8 laws stemmed from initiatives taken by MPs out of a total of 
2,740 new laws passed between 1974 and 1999 (To Vima, 27 September 1999).  
Moreover, even newly established mechanisms, such the ‘Prime Minister’s time’, have 
declined rapidly (Ta Nea, 30 December 2000).   
 The amendment in spring 2001 (Hellenic Parliament, 2001) of the Hellenic 
Constitution of 1975/86 has led to the indirect, and therefore, timid constitutionalisation of 
the right of the Parliament to be informed by the government with regard to EU legislation 
which in the domestic arena falls within the domain of the law.  The new provision of Art. 
70 para. 8 of the Constitution (Hellenic Republic 2001) refers to ‘the manner in which the 
Parliament is informed by the Government’ as regards the aforementioned issues but falls 
short of explicitly defining how this is to be achieved3.  Nevertheless, despite the 
symbolic importance of this development, the pattern of incremental and path dependent 
change remains evident and is not likely to enhance the role of the Parliament in the 
process of EU policy formulation.  Indeed, the new provision merely states that the 
Parliament ‘is informed’ about, and ‘debates’ the aforementioned issues.   
 
III. Conceptualising change: Incrementalism and path dependence 
 
 Parliaments, like all institutions, interact with the environment in which they 
operate.  The ‘signals’ that have stemmed from the process of integration since the 1970s 
underline not only the loss of power but also the enhancement of competing institutional 
actors like the European Parliament.  Since the 1970s the French and the British 
parliaments have engaged in a process that expanded their involvement in European 
affairs.  This process has remained under the control of the French and British 
governments.  In France the process of institutional change has gone as far as the 
constitutionalisation of scrutiny of the government’s EU policy.  The constitutional nature 
of the French government’s obligation to inform the Parliament immediately after 
receiving EU documents is the most important feature of the French system but it should 
give no illusions as to its practical implications for the role of the French government in 
the policy process.   
Arguably, neither the French nor the British government is obliged to follow the 
line taken by Parliament.  Both in France and the UK the terms used in the relevant 
documents can give a false impression of disproportionate parliamentary influence.  This 
is so because emphasis is, understandably, placed on the obligations imposed on the two 
governments.  In both cases, however, the content of these obligations focuses on the idea 
 
3 Rather, for that purpose, it refers to the Parliament’s Internal Rules of Procedure.   
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that governments must ensure that the two parliaments have merely completed the process 
of scrutiny before ministers express an official view in Brussels.  The two parliaments 
have no power to dictate to the governments the stance they should take in a given case.  
Moreover, if the two governments consider that they must pursue a specific course of 
action before the end of scrutiny, they are perfectly entitled to do so.   
The process of institutional change in all three parliaments is primarily 
underpinned by the increasing importance of EU affairs in the national context.  
Parliaments have felt the need to ‘catch up’ with the pace of integration that has increased 
since the late 1970s and especially in the 1980s and 1990s.  Catching up has involved 
marginal institutional changes which have been largely motivated by the need to address 
problems stemming from basic institutional characteristics of the Union rather than those 
of national polities, namely, the capacity of governments to legislate in Brussels by 
adopting legal measures that prevail over domestic legislation.   
Institutional change in the three parliaments discussed in this article has failed to 
challenge established patterns of interaction with national executives.  More importantly, 
promoters of institutional change have been aware of these patterns and explicitly or 
implicitly have sought not to challenge them.  Raymond Barre, an opposition MP and 
former Prime Minister, stated in 1992 (Alberton, 1995, p. 927) that it would be seriously 
inappropriate for the Parliament to undermine the government’s freedom to negotiate.  
John MacGregor, Leader of the House of Commons, acknowledged in 1991 that ministers 
would have a stronger negotiating position in Brussels if they were aware of the views of 
the Parliament.   
The responses of the three national parliaments exhibit three cross-national 
patterns.  First, they have largely reacted to the development of integration in Europe.  
The most significant part of their reaction followed the first direct election of MEPs (in 
the cases of France and the UK) and was confirmed after the Single European Act and the 
Maastricht Treaty.  This illustrates the limits of these reactions, since the deepening of 
integration has  
(a) increased the use of qualified majority voting (QMV), thus restraining the capacity of 
individual governments to shape decisions in Brussels; and  
(b) enhanced the role of the European Parliament in the EU decision-making process.   
Ironically, these developments have instigated the responses of the three national 
parliaments described above.   
Second, their reactions have displayed an incremental logic marked by slow, small 
and marginal changes based on each parliament’s existing institutional repertoires.  In all 
three cases parliaments have used familiar mechanisms and procedures which they have 
modified only marginally.  These modifications – the establishment of two délégations 
which dealt with a part of what until then was considered as part of foreign affairs and 
later the constitutionalisation of the process in France; the establishment of permanent 
standing committees in the UK and the participation of Greek MEPs as full members of a 
committee of the Greek Parliament – do not touch upon core characteristics of each polity.  
Rather, they are simply attempts to enable these parliaments to be more aware of what 
ministers do in Brussels.   
Incrementalism is manifest even in the pace of change.  It is an illustration of the 
desperation with which these parliaments have regarded the process of integration, in 
particular the expansion of the use of QMV.  The case of Westminster is particularly 
illustrative in that respect since it failed to establish strong scrutiny procedures when the 
UK acceded to the EC, a period when the issue of the impact of membership was hotly 
debated in the domestic political arena.  Rather, both Westminster and the French 
Parliament have acquired nominal powers which have become a useful tool in the hands 
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of skilful governments which initially were meant to be constrained.  British and French 
governments viewed calls for increased participation by national parliaments in the 
domestic process of policy formulation as an opportunity to enhance their own negotiating 
position, whether by gaining time (a valuable resource in public policy) or by adopting 
arguments that suit their views.   
Third, parliamentary responses follow a path dependent logic that is consistent 
with long-established patterns reflecting the subordinate position of these three 
parliaments within national polities.  Indeed, as Mény rightly argues (1993, p. 268), the 
frequently deplored decline of parliamentary powers is anything but a new political 
phenomenon.  This applies to all three cases examined here.  Indeed, even Norton, who 
argues that the House of Commons has been a marginal actor in the making of public 
policy in Britain since the 19th century (1984), bases his classification of the Commons as 
a ‘policy-influencer’ on its capacity to influence ‘application and evaluation’ rather than 
the formulation of public policy.   
The most striking feature of the British ‘constraint’ is the defensive and negative 
attitude that it illustrates.  The negative character of this provision, i.e. the emphasis on 
avoiding agreement in Brussels, is the result of a growing awareness of the inability of 
Westminster to positively influence government action.4  Further, the wording of the 
relevant documents actually gives the impression that a negative stance would by 
definition be acceptable to Parliament.  This attitude stems from the continuing political 
salience of EU affairs in the UK.  In that sense, it too is an illustration of path dependence.   
Unlike the British case, the weakness of the French and the Greek Parliaments is 
primarily linked to specific turning points in the history of the two polities, namely, the 
advent of the Fifth Republic in the former case and, in the latter, the end of military rule in 
1974 and the period of political instability that preceded it.  In France, the weakness of the 
parliament is a response to the government instability and parliamentary dominance that 
marked the Third and Fourth French Republics.  The ‘rationalised’ parliamentary system 
introduced in 1958 went as far as transforming the Prime Minister, rather than the 
President of the Assembly, into the metteur en scène of parliamentary proceedings 
(Quermonne and Chagnollaud, 1991, p. 54).  Despite the constitutionalisation of scrutiny, 
French MPs remain aware of the limited role of the French Parliament in EU affairs.  In a 
report compiled on behalf of the legal commission of the Assemblée Nationale, Alain 
Lamassoure, a former Deputy Minister for European Affairs, underlines the ‘relative 
failure’ of the system but crucially also acknowledges that these arrangements have 
actually become a ‘new diplomatic instrument’ (Assemblée Nationale/Délégation pour 
l’Union européenne, 1998, p. 16).  These arrangements enabled the French government to 
give the impression that it did all it could to enhance the role of the French Parliament in 
the policy process whilst remaining free in the conduct of negotiations in Brussels.  It 
achieved this by invoking the internal rules of procedure of the Council over which it has 
only partial influence.  More importantly, it managed to create a credible and respected 
method for gaining time and normatively valuable arguments in EU negotiations.  
Invoking in the Council of Ministers the need to wait until the Parliament has completed 
the scrutiny of draft EU legislation is certainly a powerful argument, one that is respected 
by the representatives of other member states.  While the French government has made 
full use of the resolutions that strengthen its negotiating position, it has ignored the ones 
 
4 To be sure, the weakening of Westminster is part of a process underpinned by three factors: the advent of 
mass parties; strong party discipline; and the establishment of alternative forms of representation of social 
interests (Lenman, 1992, p. 8; Johnson, 1977, p. 46).  Further, the party necessarily remains the essential 
point of reference for MPs and peers (Norton, 1991, p. 11).  Although dissent does appear in Westminster, it 
takes the form of protest by MPs who hold no other office (Lenman, 1992, p. 9). 
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that diverge from its views (Rizutto, 1995, p. 56).  The usefulness of these arrangements 
had previously been tested by the British government, which has managed to appease 
Westminster by accepting the obligation of ministers to wait until the end of the scrutiny 
process before they agree on a proposal whilst introducing a broad definition of the 
reasons they could invoke in order to avoid this largely procedural obligation.   
The case of the Greek Parliament confirms this pattern.  The Constitution of 1975 
has not allowed the creation of parliamentary mechanisms that could mitigate, even 
marginally, the alienation of the Parliament from the management of the country’s 
external relations (Venizelos, 1986, p. 57).  Thus, the Parliament had already developed a 
passive attitude towards the policy process before the accession.  Although membership 
was initially a politically contentious issue, after the mid-1980s it became a point of 
convergence between the main political parties, thereby removing any party political 
interest from the creation of an original and powerful scrutiny mechanism.  More 
importantly, even the form of innovation points to the direction of path dependent and 
incremental institutional change: the involvement of Greek MEPs in the European 
Community Affairs Committee highlighted the idea that the Greek Parliament was aware 
of its historically defined inability to shape or simply restrain government action.  It is 
both politically and legally impossible to hold the government accountable by means of a 
committee that includes members of an institution of the EU.  In that sense, even limited 
innovation bears the hallmarks of continuity.   
It is hardly surprising that these parliaments remain essentially unable to shape 
national EU policy.  Institutional change is impaired by the logic embodied in institutional 
arrangements.  The definition of ‘appropriate’ forms of institutional change remains 
largely based on existing institutional repertoires.  Hence, the efforts of reformers are 
curbed by deeply rooted and historically defined conceptions of ‘appropriate’ institutional 
change.  Indeed, when Laurent Fabius, then President of the French Assemblée Nationale, 
proposed the transformation of the délégation into a permanent parliamentary 
commission, his proposal was rejected for being ‘too bold’ (Belloubet-Frier, 1995, p. 




This article has sought to analyse the processes and mechanisms by which the 
French, British and Greek parliaments have responded to the challenges stemming from 
the process of European integration.  These responses have relied on each parliament’s 
standard operating procedures, institutional repertoires and mechanisms, and have been 
underpinned by a limited amount of innovation.  The three parliaments have remained 
unable to impose their views on national governments.  The process of institutional 
change they have engaged in remains firmly under the control of national governments.  
The British and the French governments have used this opportunity to enhance their 
negotiating position in Brussels.  They have achieved this objective by allowing the 
creation of EU-specific mechanisms for scrutiny.  Nevertheless, these mechanisms have 
failed to go so far as to fetter the autonomy of governments.  Furthermore, these responses 
have been reactive in the sense that they have largely followed the development of 
European integration.   
Finally, the pace of institutional change has been incremental while its direction 
has been path dependent.  Change has proceeded by means of small, marginal steps based 
on existing institutional repertoires in a manner that has reproduced the historically 
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defined weakness of these parliaments5.  This weakness is not a new phenomenon.  
Rather, it is linked to specific events (in France and Greece) or stems from a wider 
national pattern (in the case of the UK).  In that sense, it can hardly come as a surprise to 
citizens and scholars interested in the development of national polities.  However, these 
conclusions are not necessarily applicable elsewhere.  Clearly, further research is needed 
before broader claims are made.   
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5 It is important to note that the Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union 
appended to the Treaty of Amsterdam actually confirms the normative aspect of the involvement of national 
parliaments in EU policy-making.  After restating the principle of institutional autonomy, which allows 
member states to participate in the EU policy process on the basis of their respective constitutional 
arrangements, the fifteen governments have merely harmonised the period (six weeks) that elapses between 
making a legislative proposal available in all languages and its inclusion on the agenda of the Council and 
the European Parliament, subject to exceptions on grounds of urgency, the reasons for which are to be stated 
in the act or common position in question.   
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